Tipping in climate negotiations

Howard Kunreuther, Geoffrey Heal
Project Complete

In this project we developed a theoretical paper which posits that it may be very useful to look at international climate negotiations as a non-cooperative game with multiple equilibria so that one can determine a tipping set for moving  to a more desirable equilibrium. Thinking about tipping provides a novel perspective on finding a way forward in climate negotiations and suggests an alternative to the current framework of negotiating a global agreement on reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. We reviewed recent work on non‐cooperative games which show that games with increasing differences have multiple equilibria and have a “tipping set,” a subset of agents who by changing from the inefficient to the efficient equilibrium can induce all others to do the same. Thus, we argue that international climate negotiations may form such a game and so have a tipping set. This set is a small group of countries who by adopting climate control measures can make in the interests of all others to do likewise.

Major Findings

• We reviewed recent work on non-cooperative games which show that games with increasing differences have multiple equilibria and have a “tipping set”, a subset of agents who by changing from the inefficient to the efficient equilibrium can induce all others to do the same.
• We argue that international climate negotiations may form such a game and so have a tipping set. This set is a small group of countries who by adopting climate control measures can make it in the interests of all others to do likewise.

CRED2 Award (2010-2015): Funding was provided under the cooperative agreement NSF SES-0951516 awarded to the Center for Research on Environmental Decisions.